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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few issues have perplexed world leaders more than the Israeli-
Palestinian border dispute and, in particular, the question of who 
should lay claim to the city of Jerusalem. For many years, the United 
States and other nations have labored to achieve a peaceful resolution 
to this quandary, with little success to show for their efforts.1 Caught 
in the midst of this fray is Menachem Zivotofsky, a young American 
citizen who asks only that his U.S. passport reflect his country of 
birth.2 His request, as simple it may seem, has created a constitutional 
tug-of-war in which all three branches of the U.S. government are 
forced to debate their proper role in the dispute. 
Although the issue of who should control Jerusalem is 
complicated and involves sensitive foreign policy concerns, the 
disposition of M.B.Z. v. Clinton3 should pose no comparable difficulty 
for the Supreme Court. At its heart, the issue presented by this case is 
a separation of powers dispute with a clear answer. Congress passed a 
law ordering the President to perform a task involving policy 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  See generally Isabel Kershner, Israel Supports Proposal to Restart Mideast Talks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/world/middleeast/israel-supports-prop 
osal-to-restart-mideast-talks.html?sq=israel&st=cse&scp=3&pagewanted=print (highlighting 
some of the most recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian border dispute, including the 
ongoing difficulty of determining the future of Jerusalem). 
 2.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub 
nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699). 
 3.  M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. argued Nov. 7, 2011). 
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determinations over which the President has sole authority under the 
Constitution. Instead of holding the statute unconstitutional, however, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decided it could 
not hear the case because of the “political question doctrine”—a 
doctrine that prohibits courts from calling into question decisions that 
are exclusively within the province of presidential or congressional 
power.4 Political-question considerations are not necessary, however, 
for the Supreme Court to resolve this dispute. Because it has both the 
jurisdiction and the practical ability to decide this case, the Court 
should do so and should declare the statute unconstitutional. 
Moreover, the Court should take this opportunity to clarify the 
appropriate application of the political question doctrine so that 
lower courts do not dismiss cases as non-justiciable that they rightly 
ought to decide. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
For over six decades, it has been the policy of the United States to 
express no official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel.5 
Although Israel has claimed Jerusalem as its capital since 1950 and 
has effectively controlled the city since the 1967 Six Day War, the 
issue remains contentious between Israelis and Palestinians.6 In an 
effort to help both sides broker a broader peace agreement, the 
United States has chosen not to take a position on the issue until the 
two sides reach an amicable solution.7 In compliance with this policy, 
when issuing passports and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad, the 
Department of State records a citizen’s birthplace as “Jerusalem” 
rather than “Jerusalem, Israel.”8 
In 2002, however, Congress passed the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act.9 This legislation, specifically Section 214(d), directs 
the Secretary of State to “record the place of birth as Israel” on 
passports and Consular Reports of Birth Abroad for U.S. citizens born 
in Jerusalem if they so request.10 President George W. Bush signed the 
 
 4.  Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1231–32. 
 5.  Id. at 1228. 
 6.  Brief for Appellee at 6–7, Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 444 F.3d 614 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (No. 04-5395). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1228. 
 9.  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2652 (West 
2006). 
 10.  Id. 
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bill into law, but issued a signing statement explaining that he 
regarded Section 214 as advisory and in violation of the recognition 
power.11 United States policy toward Israel, he explained, had not 
changed.12 
In October of the same year, Menachem Zivotofsky was born in 
Jerusalem as a U.S. citizen.13 His mother, also a U.S. citizen, asked that 
his passport and Consular Report of Birth Abroad list his birthplace 
as “Jerusalem, Israel.”14 In accordance with State Department policy, 
the Embassy refused, listing his birthplace only as “Jerusalem.”15 In 
2003, Zivotofsky, through his parents, filed an action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, requesting that the Department of State list 
Israel as his place of birth.16 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia dismissed his claim for lack of standing—since he could use 
his passport regardless of how it listed his place of birth—and because 
it presented a non-justiciable political question.17 The court ruled that 
Zivotofsky’s desired outcome would require it to recognize Jerusalem 
as part of Israel, which would be an impermissible infringement on 
the Executive’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns.18 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed the district court’s decision on standing, ruling instead that 
Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act conferred 
upon Zivotofsky a statutory right to have his passport list his 
birthplace as “Israel.”19 The court of appeals then remanded the case 
to the district court to develop a more complete record and to 
determine whether Section 214 is mandatory or advisory.20 On 
remand, the district court ruled once more that the issue before it 
posed a non-justiciable political question and dismissed the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.21 On appeal, a three-judge panel of 
the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling.22 In June of 
 
 11.  Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1229. The “recognition power” refers to the President’s power 
to recognize foreign nations, derived from Article II of the U.S. Constitution and discussed infra 
Part II.B. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 1229–30. 
 19.  Id. at 1230. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1228. 
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2010, the court of appeals denied rehearing of the case en banc.23 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine finds its roots in the separation of 
powers principles envisioned in Marbury v. Madison,24 but the modern 
doctrine is based primarily upon the reasoning and test set forth in 
Baker v. Carr.25 In Baker, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
constitutionality of a state statute allocating legislative representation 
among its counties presented a non-justiciable political question.26 
What emerged was a six-factor test that directs courts to consider 
whether the issue at hand presents: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of 
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of 
a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing a 
lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.27 
By articulating this test, the Court sought to identify cases that courts 
could hear (i.e., where jurisdiction is properly established) but should 
not hear because of the inappropriateness of the subject matter given 
the proper role and abilities of the Judiciary.28 The Court explained 
that the presence of any one of these factors could preclude a court’s 
hearing of a case, but explained that there is a difference between 
“political questions” and “political cases.”29 Cases ought not be 
dismissed as non-justiciable simply because the subject matter is 
 
 23.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 610 F.3d 84, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 24.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (explaining that the Constitution gives 
the political branches the sole discretion to make some determinations and that these are not 
reviewable by courts). 
 25.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 26.  Id. at 189. 
 27.  Id. at 217. 
 28.  See id. at 198 (explaining the difference between lack of jurisdiction and non-
justiciability). 
 29.  Id. at 217. 
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political in nature, but rather because of the “impossibility of 
resolution” by judicial means.30 Employing this reasoning, the Court 
found that the case before it was justiciable because it posed none of 
the problems the Court identified, because the plaintiffs could 
properly bring suit under the Fourteenth Amendment, and because 
judicially manageable standards were available for the resolution of 
the case.31 
The distinction between political questions and political cases is 
highlighted in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean 
Society.32 In that case, the Court was asked to determine whether, 
based on federal legislation and international whaling agreements, the 
Secretary of Commerce should find Japan in violation of those 
agreements and make proper notifications to the President.33 The 
petitioners argued that the issue before the Court was a non-
justiciable political question because it involved foreign relations 
considerations that are best left to the Executive.34 The Court 
disagreed and explained that “not every matter touching on politics is 
a political question.”35 Furthermore, the political question doctrine 
only prohibits the Judiciary from making “policy choices and value 
determinations constitutionally committed for resolution” by the 
other branches.36 The Court decided, however, that it needed only to 
interpret executive agreements and congressional legislation—tasks 
that the Court is well equipped, and indeed designed, to accomplish—
and thus declined to apply the framework in Baker.37 In so doing, the 
Court sought to distinguish between issues with genuine political 
questions—which courts are not equipped to decide—and issues with 
merely political consequences—which courts can and should resolve. 
More recently, the Court considered Nixon v. United States,38 one 
of only two cases since Baker in which the Court found an issue to be 
a non-justiciable political question.39 The Court was asked to consider 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 226. 
 32.  478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
 33.  Id. at 228–30. 
 34.  Id. at 229. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 230. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 39.  See generally id.; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that whether the Ohio 
National Guard employed proper procedures for training and equipping its soldiers presented a 
non-justiciable political question). Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion in Zivotofsky, 
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whether the Senate conducted a proper impeachment proceeding for 
a federal judge.40 This question, the Court determined, was non-
justiciable primarily because Article I of the Constitution grants 
Congress the “sole” power to conduct impeachments.41 Thus, deciding 
the adequacy of the Senate’s impeachment procedures would 
necessarily require the Court to make determinations that are 
explicitly reserved for Congress.42 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court found it necessary to “interpret the text in question and 
determine whether and to what extent the issue [was] textually 
committed.”43 Having decided that the issue was explicitly reserved to 
another branch by the Constitution, the Court concluded that judicial 
review was inappropriate in this instance and, in doing so, laid out the 
appropriate textual commitment analysis for lower courts to employ.44 
B. The Recognition Power 
The recognition power finds its origins in Article II, Section 3 of 
the Constitution, which grants the President the power to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public ministers” from foreign nations.45 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that “[p]olitical 
recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.”46 The Court has 
long held that the President has the power to decide the “sovereignty 
of any island or country.”47 This power does not just include the ability 
to decide which governments to recognize, but also the ability to 
“determine the policy which is to govern the question of 
recognition.”48 Congress, too, has traditionally acknowledged the 
President’s power to recognize foreign governments.49 The extent to 
 
asserts that the scarcity of these holdings is a reflection of the narrowness of the political 
question doctrine. See Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1236–37 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(Edwards, J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 
10-699) (“The political question doctrine is purposely very narrow in scope.”). Additionally, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Court would be reluctant to deny itself the power to hear a case.  
 40.  Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226. 
 41.  Id. at 230–31. 
 42.  Id. at 231. 
 43.  Id. at 228. 
 44.  Id. at 238. 
 45.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This provision is typically referred to as the “Recognition 
Clause.” 
 46.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964). 
 47.  Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) (holding that the President had the 
sole authority to decide what country exercised sovereignty over the Falkland Islands). 
 48.  United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). 
 49.  See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power of Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 312–13 (2001) (explaining that Congress never questioned President 
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which the recognition power applies to passports is less certain, 
though the Court has held that a passport is a “letter of introduction” 
from one sovereign to another and that the President has traditionally 
had authority over the issuance and revocation of passports.50 
IV.  HOLDING 
In July of 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed the district court’s ruling that Zivotofsky’s claim 
posed a non-justiciable political question.51 The court began its inquiry 
by identifying the issue before it.52 Because Zivotofsky asked the 
court to “instruct the Executive to comply with Section 214(d)” and 
issue a new passport, the court framed the question presented as 
“whether the State Department can lawfully refuse to record his place 
of birth as ‘Israel.’”53 
The court concluded that granting Zivotofsky’s request would 
require it to review a decision made pursuant to the President’s 
exclusive recognition power, which it is forbidden to do.54 The decision 
whether to denote Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel” implicated a 
myriad of foreign policy decisions that amounted to choosing whether 
Israel’s sovereignty extends to Jerusalem.55 Because the power to 
recognize foreign governments is granted exclusively to the President 
by the Constitution, his exercise of that power is not subject to review 
by the courts.56 Zivotofsky, the court decided, was asking it to do just 
that.57 By ordering the Department of State to issue Zivotofsky an 
amended passport, the court would “directly contravene the 
President’s policy” and “call into question the President’s exercise of 
the recognition power.”58 
Zivotofsky argued that it was not necessary to invoke the political 
question doctrine because Congress had already determined the 
status of Jerusalem and the court needed only to enforce a federal 
 
Washington’s decisions over which countries to recognize). 
 50.  Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–94 (1981). 
 51.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub 
nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699). 
 52.  Id. at 1230. 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id. at 1231. 
 55.  Id. at 1231–32. 
 56.  Id. at 1231. 
 57.  Id. at 1232. 
 58.  Id. 
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statute.59 The court asserted, however, that it was required to begin its 
inquiry with the political-question analysis because it is a 
jurisdictional analysis that must precede any consideration of the case 
on the merits—thus, the court believed that it could not even reach 
the question of whether it could enforce the statute.60 That 
Zivotofsky’s claim was based on a statutory challenge to the 
President’s exercise of power was “of no moment” to the court, which 
did not want “to be the first court to hold that a statutory challenge to 
executive action trumps the analysis in Baker and Nixon and renders 
the political question doctrine inapplicable.”61 Instead, the court 
concluded that considering the merits of the case at all would require 
it to make decisions reserved to the Executive and it declined to do 
so.62 
Senior Circuit Judge Edwards’s concurring opinion took a very 
different view of the case. The judge agreed with the majority that the 
decision whether to include “Israel” on Zivotofsky’s passport was an 
exercise of the President’s recognition power and thus not reviewable 
by courts.63 The judge differed, however, on the precise issue before 
the court. Judge Edwards pointed to the important distinction 
between lack of jurisdiction and non-justiciability—in the former, 
immediate dismissal is required because the court does not have the 
power to hear the case, whereas in the latter, “consideration of the 
cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed” because “the 
[c]ourt’s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether 
the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially 
determined.”64 
The judge explained that, because Zivotofsky had standing to 
bring his claim and properly invoked the court’s statutory jurisdiction, 
the real issue before the court was whether Section 214(d) of the 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 1233. 
 62.  Id. at 1232–33. 
 63.  Id. at 1243 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 64.  Id. at 1236 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). The majority 
acknowledged Judge Edwards’s distinction between jurisdiction and justiciability as 
“interesting,” and acknowledged that Baker makes the same distinction, but ultimately chose 
not to “grapple” with it “because it makes no practical difference in the outcome of the case.” 
Id. at 1233 n.3 (majority opinion). In either situation, the majority believed that it was required 
to dismiss the suit outright. Id. Judge Edwards’s assertion is simply that making this distinction 
allows the court to consider the constitutional validity of the enactment, where a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction would not. Id. at 1236–37 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
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Foreign Relations Authorization Act is a constitutionally valid 
enactment.65 Because he agreed with the district court and the 
majority that the recognition power belongs exclusively to the 
Executive, Judge Edwards viewed it as “inescapable” that Section 
214(d) violates the Constitution, and that Zivotofsky’s case should be 
dismissed for want of a viable cause of action rather than for want of 
justiciability.66 
V.  ARGUMENTS 
A. The Petitioner’s Arguments 
In his brief to the Supreme Court, Zivotofsky advances two 
primary arguments: first, that the case is not barred by the political 
question doctrine, and second, that the statute is a constitutionally 
valid enactment. First, Zivotofsky claims that the political question 
doctrine does not bar the Court from hearing this case because he 
“seeks only the enforcement of the very straight-forward command of 
Section 214(d).”67 He argues that the doctrine only prohibits courts 
from hearing cases that require determinations “beyond the 
competence of judges” or that ask courts to make policy 
considerations that are not “legal in nature.”68 These sorts of 
considerations, Zivotofsky argues, are not required in this case 
because Congress has already made the necessary policy 
determinations by enacting Section 214(d).69 The political-question 
analysis set forth in Baker, he explains, is not necessary when the 
other branches have already decided the political issues at hand.70 
Here the Court is not making independent political determinations, 
but is tasked only with deciding whether Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to enact this legislation.71 This is a separation 
of powers issue of the kind that the Court is more than able to hear 
and decide.72 
 
 
 65.  Id. at 1234 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 66.  Id. at 1245. 
 67.  Brief for Petitioner at 25, M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. June 29, 2011). 
 68.  Id. at 27 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
(1986)). 
 69.  Id. at 29. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 29–30. 
 72.  Id. 
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Zivotofsky also argues that the relevant precedent in this case is 
Japan Whaling Association rather than Baker.73 He points out that, in 
Japan Whaling Association, the Court chose not to apply the 
framework in Baker because “the central issue depended on 
construction of a federal statute.”74 In that case, the Court noted that 
interpreting federal legislation “is a recurring and accepted task for 
the federal courts,” which Zivotofsky argues the Court should 
undertake in this case.75 
Second, Zivotofsky argues that Section 214(d) is a constitutionally 
valid enactment. In support of this proposition, he claims that the 
Recognition Clause does not necessarily give the President the 
exclusive power to recognize foreign governments and that, even if it 
does, it certainly does not give him the power to determine the status 
of particular cities or territories.76 Instead, Zivotofsky argues that the 
President only has the power to conduct foreign policy in compliance 
with or in the absence of congressional legislation.77 Where Congress 
has spoken on a matter, the President must comply with its 
directives.78 Finally, Zivotofsky argues that no meaningful harm will 
come of the Court’s enforcement of Section 214(d) because the 
Department of State’s dire predictions of the effects on U.S. foreign 
policy are overstated.79 If any foreign criticism does result from 
enforcement, he explains, it will be because “the Department of State 
has magnified the issue and issued a self-fulfilling prophecy” of unrest 
in the Arab world.80 
B. The Respondent’s Arguments 
In her brief to the Court, the Secretary argues first that the 
recognition power can only be exercised by the President, and second, 
that Zivotofsky’s suit presents a non-justiciable political question. 
Regarding the recognition power, the Secretary argues that it belongs 
exclusively to the President and that it includes both the ability to 
recognize foreign governments and to formulate the policy that 
 
 73.  Id. at 30. 
 74.  Id. at 31. 
 75.  Id. (quoting Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)). 
 76.  Id. at 34. 
 77.  Id. at 35. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
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governs the issue of recognition.81 Relying on Supreme Court 
precedent, she explains that this power extends to passports because 
they are effectively “instrument[s] of diplomacy” insofar as they are a 
form of official communication between governments.82 The Secretary 
concedes that Congress may regulate passports to an extent “that is 
necessary and proper to implement its own enumerated foreign-
affairs powers,” but not to the extent that it constrains the President’s 
ability to conduct diplomacy.83 The current U.S. passport policy with 
regard to Jerusalem is a function of the President’s recognition power 
because the decision of how to describe a place in U.S. passports 
“operates as an official statement of whether the United States 
recognizes a state’s sovereignty over a territorial area.”84 
The Secretary argues further that because Zivotofsky’s suit asks 
the Court to call into question the Executive’s exercise of the 
recognition power, the Court must not adjudicate the question in the 
first place.85 In particular, the Secretary points out that the first Baker 
factor calls for an analysis of the extent to which the Constitution 
commits the issue before the Court to a determination by another 
branch.86 If the Court finds that such a commitment is present and 
that Zivotofsky’s requested relief therefore requires the Court to 
review a determination that is committed to another branch, the 
proper course of action is to dismiss the suit.87 It makes no difference 
that Zivotofsky sued based on a statutory right because “Congress 
cannot, by creating a statutory right, confer on the courts the 
authority to decide a question that the Constitution commits to the 
Executive.”88 A non-justiciable political question does not suddenly 
become justiciable because Congress has put forth legislation on the 
matter; rather, it is the type of relief the plaintiff requests that must 
drive a court’s initial analysis.89 In the Secretary’s view, whether a case 
presents a political question is “a threshold issue of justiciability” and 
must be decided before the Court determines whether the plaintiff is 
entitled to relief.90 
 
 81.  Brief for Respondent at 29, M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2011). 
 82.  Id. at 31 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–93 (1981)). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 38. 
 85.  Id. at 42–43. 
 86.  Id. at 42. 
 87.  Id. at 46. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 44. 
 90.  Id. at 52–53. 
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Although the Secretary would have the Court dismiss the suit 
outright as non-justiciable, she does propose that the Court should, in 
the alternative, strike down Section 214(d) as unconstitutional 
because it impermissibly infringes on the President’s recognition 
power.91 The Secretary explains that the legislation “seeks to obtain 
reversal of the Executive’s longstanding recognition policy regarding 
Jerusalem”—something the Constitution does not permit Congress to 
do.92 
VI.  OUTCOME AND ANALYSIS 
When the Supreme Court decides M.B.Z. v. Clinton, it likely will—
and more importantly should—conclude first that the political 
question doctrine is not applicable to the case, and second, that 
Section 214(d) is an unconstitutional infringement of the Executive’s 
recognition power. The political question doctrine prevents federal 
courts from deciding issues they are not equipped to decide—that is, 
instances where judicial relief is impractical or inappropriate. Courts 
are equipped, however, to decide issues of constitutional 
interpretation and to resolve disputes over the separation of powers, 
and the Supreme Court ought to do so in this case. Furthermore, the 
Court ought to offer some guidance to the lower courts as to the 
appropriate application of the political question doctrine. 
A. The Issue Before the Court 
The issue properly before the Court is “[w]hether Section 214(d)   
. . . impermissibly infringes on the President’s power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns.”93 Exploring the historical understanding of the 
recognition power and Supreme Court precedent demonstrates not 
only that the power to recognize foreign governments belongs 
exclusively to the President, but also that this power extends to any 
official action taken in furtherance of that power. 
First, the Executive’s power to recognize foreign governments is 
perhaps best understood in the context in which the federal 
government first chose to allocate it. In the early days of the Republic, 
Congress never questioned President Washington’s decisions about 
which governments to recognize.94 In fact, President Washington never 
 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 53–54. 
 93.  M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699). 
 94.  See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 49, at 312–13 (“Congress never purported to tell 
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consulted Congress when determining whether to recognize the new 
French Republic, in part because his cabinet unanimously agreed that 
it was unnecessary.95 Thus, President Washington’s actions and 
Congress’s acquiescence in the field of foreign relations suggest the 
power to recognize foreign governments was intended to reside with 
the Executive.96 
Second, Supreme Court precedent on the recognition power, 
developed throughout the Court’s history, reflects this early 
understanding of the power. The Court has not only held that this 
power belongs exclusively to the President,97 but also that it extends 
to decisions about territory that another country claims to control.98 
Perhaps more importantly, the Court has held that the Executive has 
the power to “determine the policy which is to govern the question of 
recognition,”99 indicating that the recognition power is not limited to 
recognizing or not recognizing foreign sovereigns, but also includes 
the ability to formulate broad policies that are employed in 
furtherance of that power. Moreover, the Court has held that 
passports are a form of official communication between sovereigns, 
constituting a “letter of introduction” from one government to 
another.100 This indicates that passports are more than just travel 
documents and can be considered a function of broader executive 
policies. 
In light of these past decisions, the outcome of this issue seems 
clear. If the President has the power to decide how to recognize 
particular territories and the ability to formulate policy in furtherance 
of that power, it follows logically that he may decide whether to name 
a territory as part of a foreign country in official diplomatic 
documents. It is counterintuitive to suppose that the President has the 
power to proclaim that Jerusalem is not part of Israel but can then be 
required to refer to the city in passports and other official documents 
as “Israel.” This would almost certainly frustrate the President’s 
ability to exercise the recognition power and to formulate coherent 
 
Washington which countries to recognize.”). 
 95.  Id. at 312. 
 96.  See id. at 312–13 (“Washington’s actions reflect a consensus shared by Washington, his 
cabinet, and Congress.”). 
 97.  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (stating that 
“[p]olitical recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive”). 
 98.  Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839). 
 99.  United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). 
 100.  Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292–93 (1981). 
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foreign policy.101 Thus, under current jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court is likely to hold that Section 214(d) impermissibly infringes on 
the President’s recognition power. 
B. Justiciability 
In Baker, the Court took care to distinguish between a court’s lack 
of power to hear a case for want of jurisdiction and a court’s inability 
to decide the issues before it for want of judicially manageable 
standards.102 In the present controversy, the Court has both the power 
to hear the case and judicially manageable standards for resolving it. 
The case requires the Court to examine a federal statute that has 
given Petitioner standing and to determine if that statute is a 
constitutionally sound enactment. Courts are both familiar with and 
well equipped to undertake these tasks.103 In Japan Whaling 
Association, the Court explained that federal courts ought to decide 
issues properly before them so long as they are not asked to 
“formulate national policies” or “develop standards for matters not 
legal in nature.”104 The Court need not make these kinds of policy 
considerations in this case because the political branches have already 
completed that task. The Court need only interpret the Constitution 
to determine which of the branches has the authority to decide this 
issue. 
C. Misapplication of the Political Question Doctrine 
Thus, the Court has the ability, both jurisdictionally and practically, 
to decide the separation of powers issue before it. The court below 
determined, however, that it was barred from doing so by the first 
strand of the Baker test—that is, because the relief requested by 
Zivotofsky would require the court to pass judgment on a decision 
that the Constitution commits to the exclusive judgment of the 
 
 101.  See Calvin Massey, M.B.Z. v. Clinton: Whither Jerusalem? 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 87, 
103 (asserting that allowing Congress to dictate how the President ought to treat disputed 
territory would be “a cumbersome, inefficient, and awkward method of conducting foreign 
relations”). 
 102. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (differentiating between lack of jurisdiction 
and non-justiciability). 
 103.  See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[U]nder 
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes.”); Lin v. 
United States, 561 F.3d 502, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing statutory interpretation as a 
“familiar task” for courts); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (explaining that 
courts have the power “to review either legislative or executive action that transgresses 
identifiable textual limits”). 
 104.  Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230. 
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President.105 The court acknowledged the existence of the statute that 
had given Zivotofsky the ability to bring his suit in the first place, but 
determined the legislation did not make its hearing of the case any 
more appropriate.106 It is precisely this statute, though, that not only 
gives the Judiciary the power to hear this case, but in fact necessitates 
it doing so. Although the Supreme Court may not challenge 
constitutionally designated presidential decisions, it may prevent 
another branch from infringing on the President’s power.107 
This proposition is highlighted in a 1976 article by Professor Louis 
Henkin critiquing the political question doctrine.108 Arguing for a 
more restrained doctrine (or, rather, the abolition of it), Professor 
Henkin noted several “jurisprudential lines which are sometimes 
confused with the ‘political question doctrine’ but which essentially 
have nothing to do with it.”109 Among these are situations in which 
“[t]he act complained of [is] within the power conferred upon the 
political branches of the federal government by the Constitution” and 
is either “law binding on the courts” or “not prohibited to [the 
branches] explicitly or by any warranted inference from the 
Constitution.”110 In these cases, Professor Henkin explains: 
[T]he court does not refuse judicial review; it exercises it. It is not 
dismissing the case or the issue as nonjusticiable; it adjudicates it. 
It is not refusing to pass on the power of the political branches; it 
passes upon it, only to affirm that they had the power which had 
been challenged and that nothing in the Constitution prohibited 
the particular exercise of it.111 
Such is the case here. The Court is not obligated to refuse 
adjudication of Zivotofsky’s claim because he questioned the 
President’s exclusive decision-making power. The Court may 
adjudicate the claim and then decide precisely that: the President has 
the exclusive authority to recognize foreign nations and he exercised 
that power within the bounds the Constitution. In so doing, the Court 
 
 105.  Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub 
nom. M.B.Z. v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (No. 10-699). 
 106.  Id. at 1233. 
 107.  See Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been 
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that 
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed . . . is a responsibility of this Court as 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”). 
 108.  Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).   
 109.  Id. at 606. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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may also decide that Congress has enacted legislation that infringes 
upon the President’s constitutionally endowed powers and declare 
that legislation unconstitutional. This outcome, no doubt, is not the 
relief that Zivotofsky envisioned when he brought his suit, but courts 
are not required to dispose of cases in precisely the manner that 
plaintiffs request. 
Although some have advocated for a more expansive use of the 
political question doctrine, even their arguments do not necessarily 
contemplate its use in cases like the one before the Court. Professor 
Rachel Barkow, for example, argues that the restriction of the 
doctrine in recent years has led the Court to hear cases better left to 
the constitutional interpretation of the other branches.112 Citing Bush 
v. Gore113 in particular, she suggests the Court has made itself the sole 
interpreter of the Constitution,114 which is something the Founders did 
not intend.115 Even under this line of reasoning, though, Zivotofsky’s 
case is still properly justiciable. Professor Barkow essentially 
advocates for a return to an early understanding of the Court’s power, 
when judicial review was rarely exercised because the Judiciary was 
more willing to defer to the constitutional interpretations of the other 
branches.116 She notes, however, that even in those days, it was well 
within the Court’s responsibility to “determine how much interpretive 
room a constitutional delegation of power gave the branch receiving 
that power” and to “declar[e] the boundaries” within which the 
political branches have room to make their own interpretations.117 
Determining appropriate constitutional boundaries is precisely 
what the Court has been called upon to do in this case. Zivotofsky’s 
claim does not reach the bounds of the political question doctrine 
because it does not require the Court to make constitutional 
determinations reserved to other branches. Instead, his claim requires 
 
 112.  See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 241 (2002) (explaining 
that, while constitutional interpretation was once a coordinate task amongst the branches, the 
Court has now put itself at the top of a hierarchy of interpretive power).   
 113.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 114.  See Barkow, supra note 112, at 336 (“The current Court appears to believe that it 
alone provides the final answer to almost all constitutional questions, while the interpretations 
of the other branches are to be accepted at the Court’s discretion.”). 
 115.  See id. at 246–48 (noting that Alexander Hamilton recognized that the resolution of 
some questions is best left to the political branches). 
 116.  See id. at 250–51 (explaining that, at the time of the Marshall Court, “[j]udicial review 
involved a spectrum of broad deference to the political branches”). 
 117.  Id. at 252. 
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the Court to decide the boundaries of the recognition power and, 
more specifically, to decide which branch is permitted to exercise it. 
The unwillingness of the D.C. Circuit to perform this task thus 
demonstrates an overzealous application of a very limited doctrine 
and an unnecessary ceding of power. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Since the earliest days of the Republic, it has been “emphatically 
the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law 
is.”118 Here, the Court has been asked to resolve a dispute between the 
branches about the powers granted to them by the Constitution.119 It 
should do just that, and take the opportunity to clarify an important 
yet easily misapplied doctrine. 
 
 
 118.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 119.  See Brief of Congressmember Anthony Weiner as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 19, M.B.Z. v. Clinton, No. 10-699 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2010) (requesting that the Court 
use this case to resolve a dispute between Congress and the President and “to straighten out the 
confused and misguided doctrine and practice revealed” by the case). 
